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INTRODUCTION
Eric Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia when he
shot and killed a police officer in Flagstaff, Arizona. z Although Eric
no longer fears the space aliens he was battling back then-since his
treatment, he has realized that they are not dangerous, but came to
Earth "to do trades for stuff, maybe like sugar and broccoli" 3-he
would be wise to remain on his guard. Society's emotional reaction to
the mentally ill has made people like Eric a target, if not for conscious
animus (though sadly, often for that, too4), then for unconscious
discrimination.
Lawmakers are not immune from this effect. When the context is
the insanity defense, everyone goes a little crazy. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Clark v. Arizonas is
otherwise inexplicable, with its unacknowledged undermining of one
of the hallmarks of society's civility: the insanity defense.6
2 Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716 (2006) (describing Clark's "undisputed"
paranoid schizophrenia).
3 2 J.A. at 120, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966). Perhaps further
treatment has helped Eric even more, though as of yet, there is still no cure for schizophrenia.
See, e.g., National Institute of Mental Health, Schizophrenia, NIH Publication No. 06-3517, at I
(Jan. 2007), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/ninihschizophrenia.pdf ("Available
treatments can relieve many of the disorder's symptoms, but most people who have
schizophrenia must cope with some residual symptoms as long as they live.").
4 Rael D. Strous, Nazi Euthanasia of the Mentally Ill at Hadamar, 163 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 27, 27 (2006) (describing Nazi plan to euthanize "life unworthy of life"--Leben
unwertes Leben--including mentally ill); Linda A. Teplin et al., Crime Victimization in Adults
with Severe Mental Illness: Comparison with the National Crime Victimization Survey, 62:8
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 911, 911 (2005) (finding severely mentally ill almost 12 times
more likely to be victims of rape, robbery, and assault than general population); Shirley Leung,
Man Is Accused in Torture Case; Raynham Police Say Mentally Ill Victims Were Lured to
Home, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1997, at B3.
5 Clark, 126 S. Ct. 2709.
6 Others have attacked the defense outright. For example, four states currently reject an
insanity defense: Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207(1) (2004), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3219(1) (1995), Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-14-102 (2005), and Utah, UTAH CODE
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Clark should have been an electrifying case, "the first major ruling
by the U.S. Supreme Court on insanity defense laws since... John
Hinckley's acquittal by reason of insanity in the 1981 shooting of
President Ronald Reagan.",7 Instead, it was greeted with a collective
yawn by the professoriate: "much ado about nothing very much
really."8 This lackadaisical response defies explanation. The Court
clearly mishandled Clark, and this mishandling contributes to a
growing confusion about the insanity defense.
9
Unfortunately for Eric and those like him, our inability to think
clearly in this arena means that they will continue to suffer. This
Article is an effort to clarify the role of the insanity defense and its
relationship to the mens rea requirement in the criminal law. We
cannot protect Eric from his aliens, but we could do a much better job
of protecting him from our own delusional thinking about insanity.'0
Part I briefly sketches the history of the insanity defense and its
justifications, and then explores society's emotional reaction to
mental illness. Fear and loathing have come to replace not only care
and compassion, but even logic. Because Arizona, like so many other
jurisdictions, misunderstands the insanity defense and its relationship
ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003). Each of these states' courts of last resort has upheld the
constitutionality of the abolition. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990); State v.
Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984); State
v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 366 (Utah 1995) (all holding that the state constitution does not
guarantee the availability of the insanity defense). Although Nevada also abolished the defense
in NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220 (2006), its Supreme Court found that statute unconstitutional.
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84 (Nev. 2001). For a thoughtful discussion of the constitutionality
of abolition, see, e.g., Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffinan, The Uneasy Entente Between
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 1, 58 (February 12, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=962945). See also infra note 189 and
accompanying text (discussing "mens rea approach," in which states permit mental illness
evidence only as to mens rea).
7 U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Arizona's Insanity Defense Law, U.S. STATE NEWS, June
29, 2006, 2006 WLNR 11315031.
8 Ron Allen, Clark v. Arizona: Much (Confused) Ado About Nothing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 135, 135 (2006). But see Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 2 (expressing concern that Clark
"clarified little, and may in fact have further muddied the conceptual and practical waters").
9 The lack of guidance from the nation's highest court in this context has been noted
before. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1379 ("We must also explore why the judiciary-and especially the
United States Supreme Court-can offer us 'no direction home' in our efforts to bring
coherence to this most incoherent area of [insanity] law.").
10 "Only when we acknowledge these psychic and physical realities-and the
anthropology of insanity defense attitudes--can we expect to make sense of the underlying
jurisprudence." Id. at 1378 (examining "[w]hy ... we feel the way we do about ... insanity
pleaders, and how ... the answer to that question preordain[s] our answers to almost all of the
legal and behavioral questions that are posed in this area... ").
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to the criminal law's mens rea I1 requirement, Eric is labeled a cold-
blooded killer deserving of blame and punishment, rather than a
mentally-ill patient deserving of sympathy and treatment. Many
people would disagree with this characterization, of course. They do
not find the mentally ill, especially those whose illnesses led them to
commit horrifying acts, to be particularly sympathetic. The law is
right to make the distinction, however, and decisions like Clark only
muddy the waters.
Part II tells the Clark story. It sounds like the second half of a bad
science fiction double feature, something that would play late at night
on a poorly funded television station. At 2 A.M., "Motel Hell,',' 2 a
film about a motel owner fond of repeating, "Meat's meat, and a
man's gotta eat."' 3 He plants stranded motorists in the garden, then
harvests them for dinner. 14 At 4 A.M., "Aliens in Arizona," in which
aliens from outer space invade Flagstaff, Arizona, poisoning
everything in their path. The hero keeps a bird in his car to warn him
of poisoned air; the aliens give the bird a robotic lung. Unfortunately
for Eric, his victim, and their families, "Aliens in Arizona" was no B
movie. Eric thought these events were real, and because he did not get
the help he needed, Officer Jeffrey Moritz is dead.
Part III first describes and then unpacks the irrationality of the
Court's reasoning in Clark. Two issues were raised: the
constitutionality of an insanity statute that differs from the traditional
formulation, and the constitutionality of prohibiting evidence
regarding mental illness to be introduced on the question of mens rea.
In addressing the insanity statute, the Court perpetuated a long-
standing confusion about the scope of the definition. In addressing the
relationship between insanity and mens rea, the Court spawned a
whole new generation of confusions.
The conclusion urges a reexamination of insanity law. Because the
criminal justice system is the first and only intervention society
provides many deeply disturbed individuals, 15 enlightened self-
" Literally "guilty mind," or the actor's mental attitude towards the prohibited act.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (8th ed. 2004). See also infra notes 163 and 173-81 and
accompanying text (further explaining mens rea).
12 MOTEL HELL (United Artists 1980).
13 Id. Memorable quotes and plot summaries are available at http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt008 1184/quotes.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: REDIRECTING RESOURCES TOWARD TREATMENT, NOT CONTAINMENT 2 (2004),
available at http://www.psych.org/downloads/MentaUllness.pdf. In 1955, the state mental
hospital population was 559,000; by 1999, it was less than 80,000. Id. Only three years later,
"there [were] fewer than 60,000." E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL
[Vol. 58:1
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interest dictates we move past our fear, and begin to see the law more
clearly. Because society is measured by its treatment of the most
vulnerable, 16 compassion dictates we do likewise.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is among the oldest of the defenses known to
criminal law. Plato taught that the penalty for murder should be
death; 17 if the actor were insane, however, the penalty should be exile
for one year. 18 In the sixth century B.C., Hebrew commentaries
explained that the insane were without fault. 19 Both church and state
"routinely exonerated" the insane in the Middle Ages, 20 and the
English common law continued this tradition. As Sir Edward Coke
put it in 1629, "the act and wrong of a mad man shall not be imputed
to him.",21 William Blackstone in the eighteenth century wrote, "idiots
and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts., 2 2 M'Naghten's
Case23 in 1843 gave famous form to this lasting concept.
FOR FAMILIES, CONSUMERS, AND PROVIDERS 20 (4th ed. 2001). See also id. at 19-24
(describing "disaster" of deinstitutionalization).
16 "The moral test of government is how that government treats those who are in the dawn
of life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life, the elderly; and those who are in the
shadows of life-the sick, the needy and the handicapped." DANIEL B. BAKER, POLITICAL
QUOTATIONS 213 (Daniel B. Baker ed., Gale Research Inc., 1990) (quoting Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, addressing the 1976 Democratic National Convention).
17 PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 266, 871d (Thomas L. Pangle, trans. Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1988) (1980) ("He who is convicted is to be given the death penalty.").
18 Id. at 258, 864d-e.
[Hie is to go away into another country and place, and dwell away from home for a
year; if he comes back prior to the time which the law has ordained, or sets foot at all
in his own country, he is to be incarcerated in the public prison by the Guardians of
the Laws for two years, and then released from prison.
Id.
19 Platt & Diamond, The Origins and Development of the "Wild Beast" Concept of
Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J. HIST. BEHAV. SC.
335, 366 (1965).
20 DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS AND IDLE HUMOuRS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 71 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1996) (1937).
21 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 247b (London, John More,
1629) (translated in Brief for the Treatment Advocacy Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716 (2006) (No. 05-5966)).
22 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24.
23 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (holding that a person may claim the
insanity defense if "at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was
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B. A Brief Survey of the Justifications for the Insanity Defense
The reason for the defense's longevity, through different times and
different cultures, rests in its universal philosophical principle. As the
United States Congress noted in 1983 (parochially, given the insanity
defense's ancient roots), to abolish the defense "would alter that
fundamental basis of Anglo-American criminal law: the existence of
moral culpability as a prerequisite for punishment."
24
As many others have eloquently explained, the insanity defense is
a necessary corollary to the foundational theories25 supporting the
concept of punishment. 26 Theories of punishment 27 can be roughly
reduced to two primary classes 28: (1) utilitarianism, or ends-based
reasoning, classically encompassing deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation;2 9 and (2) retribution, or backward-looking reasoning,
focused on the defendant's desert. 30 The insanity defense follows
necessarily from both of these theories.
For the utilitarian, punishment is justified by the good it can
accomplish. Individual offenders are deterred from reoffending when
they suffer the consequences of their actions; potential criminals are
deterred through witnessing that offender's suffering; the incorrigible
are physically prevented from reoffending by virtue of the prison
walls that separate them from society; and those who can be saved are
taught to walk the straight and narrow, not for fear of punishment, but
for love of doing what is right. For the retributivist, on the other hand,
wrong.").
24 H.R. Rep. No. 98-577, at 7-8 (1983).
25 For a full exposition of the foundational theories of utilitarianism and retribution, see
the variety of philosophers' works collected in WHAT IS JUSTICE? CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Robert C. Solomon & Mark C. Murphy eds., 2000).
26 See generally NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing
the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 788-89 (1985).
27 But see Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 97, 97
(2002). Professor Huigens demonstrates and argues against the common conflation of theories
of punishment (i.e., justifications for punishment) with the functions of punishment (i.e., what
punishment accomplishes).
28 Jurisprudence scholars also are increasingly developing hybrid theories of punishment,
attempting to blend and harmonize utilitarian with retributive theories. See, e.g., Aaron
Rappaport, The Logic of Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and Methodology of
Jurisprudence, 73 MISS. L.J. 559, 594 (2004).
29 "[A] utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful purpose the punishment
serves." Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIME & JUST. 1282, 1282 (Joshua
Dressier ed., 2d ed. 2002).
30 See, e.g., LEO KATZ ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 62-63 (1999).
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punishment is fundamentally founded on desert.3 An offender who is
not responsible is fundamentally not deserving of punishment.32
Punishing the insane serves these purposes only in the smallest
amount.33 Incapacitation and rehabilitation are better served by the
civil commitment process than by a criminal conviction. A civil
commitment is capable of even greater incapacitation than a sentence
resulting from a criminal conviction,34 and stands a better chance of
rehabilitation; many barriers to wellness and reintegration into society
are imposed by the existence of a criminal record.35 Individual
deterrence will not work on insane defendants. Those who do not
know what they are doing, or that certain prohibited conduct is
31 Under retributivism, "punishment is justified because people deserve it." Greenawalt,
supra note 29, at 347 (1981). See also John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3,4-5
(1955) ("What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds
that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should
suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing."). "For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an
offender also gives society the duty to punish." Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 182 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987). Classical philosopher Immanuel Kant was a great retributivist, arguing for
punishment, not because of any good it would accomplish, but because it was deserved:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world-the last
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried
out.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (1796-1797).
32 See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 172-73 (2006) ("tightly link[ing]" criminal responsibility to retributive
justifications of punishment). "Thus, if a person, because of a severe mental illness, does not
possess the requisite capacity for rationality, she cannot be considered ... deserving of criminal
blame and punishment. The insanity defense properly reflects the notion that a defendant whose
mental disorder renders her irresponsible is not in fact culpable." Maura Caffrey, Comment, A
New Approach to Insanity Acquittee Recidivism: Redefining the Class of Truly Responsible
Recidivists, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 423 (2005-06). See also Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation
and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the
Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 719 (2005-06)
(characterizing individual responsibility and autonomy as "crucial to the retributive
underpinnings of capital punishment").
33 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 25.03 (4th ed. 2006)
(finding no purpose furthered through punishing insane persons, but not discussing general
deterrence).
3 One is criminally incarcerated for a statutorily prescribed and judicially determined
fixed term, but civilly committed indefinitely or until "cured." See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 529 (1968) (explaining why defendants may find criminal incarceration preferable to civil
commitment).
35 See, e.g., Sabra Micah Barnett, Commentary, Collateral Sanctions and Civil
Disabilities: The Secret Barrier to True Sentencing Reform for Legislatures and Sentencing
Commissions, 55 ALA. L. REV. 375, 375 (2004) (noting that civil disabilities collateral to
criminal conviction "can act as barriers to reintegration and rehabilitation and can serve as
enablers for high recidivism rates.").
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wrong, are simply not in a position to understand why they are being
punished, and will not be able to predict what would trigger similar
punishment in the future. As mental health amici to the Court in Clark
pointedly explained, "Nor can exclusion of evidence of the effect of a
defendant's disabling condition somehow create a disincentive to
have the disability. 36 Finally, punishing the insane could have only a
slight general deterrent effect. It cannot affect other insane people, of
course, for the same reasons that specific deterrence is ineffective on
insane persons. Its effects would be limited, then, to non-insane
potential defendants who may be emboldened to commit crimes by
the thought that they will escape punishment by pretending insanity,
and who are not deterred by the knowledge of a civil commitment
alternative. 37 Thus, utilitarians are unlikely to be persuaded that the
harm imposed by punishing the mentally ill is outweighed by the very
little good it might do.
Nor are retributivists likely to jump on this bandwagon.
Defendants who do not know what they are doing or that it is wrong
cannot fairly be called responsible moral agents. Without awareness,
they do not choose to do evil in the same way that people with
awareness do. Not having chosen to do evil in the same way as those
without impairment, the insane do not merit punishment the way
others do.38 This, at heart, is the sense behind that Congressional
declaration that to abolish the defense "would alter that fundamental
basis of Anglo-American criminal law: the existence of moral
culpability as a prerequisite for punishment. 39
36 Brief of Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
Eric Michael Clark at 17 n. 28, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966), 2006
WL 247276.
37 Of course, the most persuasive point militating against general deterrence theory is the
pervasiveness of the belief that "I'll never get caught." See Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the
Law, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 847, 857 (1998) ("What makes deterrence strategies especially
prohibitive is that their viability depends upon being able to change people's estimates of the
likelihood of being caught and punished for wrongdoing.").
38 Professor Morse and Justice Hoffman provide a pointed illustration:
We do not expect other animals to understand the reason for a rule or the deterrent
value of punishment because other animals are not capable of the same degree of
rationality as homo sapiens. There are no chimp legislatures or avian police. It is
simply unfair to hold responsible, to blame and punish, mentally disordered
wrongdoers who are not morally responsible because they were not capable of being
rational at the time of the crime.
Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 61.
39 H.R. Rep. No. 98-577, at 7-8 (1983).
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C. A Brief Reality Check
Sadly, such noble sentiments about that fundamental basis of
Anglo-American criminal law are not our only feelings on the matter.
Representing our "better selves," these thoughtful justifications
reflect only our conscious intentions. Our unconscious minds are
often less generous.4 0 With our high-minded rhetorical intentions, we
simultaneously engage in an unconscious struggle to distance
ourselves from the mentally ill, resulting in less compassion for them,
and less-favorable interpretations of the criminal law.4' We feel
"profound ambivalence .... On one hand, we are especially punitive
toward the mentally disabled, 'the most despised and feared group in
society'; on the other, we recognize that in some narrow and carefully
circumscribed circumstances, exculpation is-and historically has
been-proper and necessary.
'A2
That fear is the guiding emotion behind society's crazy reaction to
the mentally ill is hardly controversial.4 3 We fear the unknown, and
the land of mental illness is almost entirely unexplored. We fear
insanity's sufferers. We walk past the ranting figures bundled in rags
40 The very act of placing an individual into a group-identifying him or her with that
group-can alter one's perception of the individual. For an excellent discussion of this
phenomenon and a review of the relevant legal and psychological literature, see Antony Page,
Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV.
155, 193-98 (2005). See also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup
Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004) (noting
that "a hundred studies have documented people's tendency... to associate negative
characteristics with outgroups more easily than ingroups"); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 952 (2006) ("[A]
positive attitude toward any ingroup necessarily implies a relative negativity toward a
complementary outgroup. In some circumstances, this relative favoring of the ingroup puts
members of other groups at a discriminatory disadvantage ...."). Indeed, it may be that we
humans must struggle daily to overcome some innately programmed fear of the "other." Id. at
961-62 (citing studies showing that implicit biases produce discriminatory behavior). See, e.g.,
Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271 (2000) (noting
less favorable treatment of those with psychiatric disabilities under the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
4' See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 40, at 952. See also Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 373 (1991)
("The dislike increases the distance between the individual and the outgroup, so that the attitude
becomes self-reinforcing.") (citing G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 29, 39-41, 78
(25th Anniversary ed. 1979); M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF, GROUPS IN HARMONY AND TENSION 218
(1966)).
42 Perlin, supra note 9, at 1378-79.
43 See generally STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS (Paul Jay Fink & Allan Tasman eds.,
1992) (exploring historical and contemporary fear and resulting stigmatization of people with
mental illness); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A
Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 107-8 (1991) (noting society's fears of people
with mental disabilities).
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on our city's sidewalks, and try to avoid eye contact. Our hearts beat a
little faster. We fear: what if they hurt me? More than that, we fear
insanity's implications for ourselves and our loved ones. What if we
had to face these demons? How would we manage? What would it
say about us?
Our reaction to these fears is a natural one, albeit unflattering. We
blame the victim.44 A well-known example of this type of thinking
appears in rape contexts.45 Many people instinctively believe that a
woman wearing a short skirt (or even jeans, revealing of a woman's
shape as they are)46  is at least partially to blame for her
victimization.47 Like a tourist counting his money on the subway, the
victim was "asking for it" by flaunting her body so openly. Those
who think this way are not being intentionally cruel; they are
protecting their emotional vulnerability. If the victim had done
nothing wrong, nothing to bring it on herself, why then, it could
happen to us. There is nothing we can do. Rather than feeling
vulnerable, we prefer to imagine that the victim is to blame. If she
brought it on herself by wearing such a short skirt, then there is
something the rest of us can do: we can dress demurely. We right-
dressing women will be safe.48
" See generally Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial)
Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 418-29 (2006) (summarizing evidence
from social psychology and related fields to explain how people who imagine themselves fair
and just routinely blame the victims of inequities and excuse the perpetrators).
45 See Deborah L. Rhode, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 11
(1997) ("Our tendency to fault women is apparent in virtually every systematic study of rape.").
The phenomenon is equally well-known as a response to accusations of sex discrimination.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (holding that a victim's "sexually
provocative speech or dress" is "obviously relevant" to whether "she found particular sexual
advances unwelcome"). See also Julie Hatfield, Defining Appropriate Dress in the Workplace,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 1992, at 31 ("[A] recent survey of 1,769 psychiatrists suggests that
many of them.., believe in a link between 'provocative' clothing and sexual harassment and
sex crimes.").
46 Nation at a Glance, THE TELEGRAPH (Calcutta, India), Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050902/asp/nation/story_5187132.asp (announcing ban on
jeans, along with t-shirts and sleeveless tops, for women at Anna University, India's largest
technological university); Gajinder Singh, Girls in Jeans No-Go at Gurdwaras, THE
TELEGRAPH (Calcutta, India), Jan. 10, 2005, available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/
1050110/asp/nation/story_4234692.asp (reporting on banning of women wearing jeans in Sikh
temples).
47 For a thorough discussion of the complex relationship between sexual abuse, women's
dress, and societal norms, see Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the
Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1309 (1992).
48 See, e.g., Alinor C. Sterling, Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and
Semiotic Meanings of Women's Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87 (1995)
(discussing how women's clothing acquires meaning in the context of a rape trial); Dressing
Begins at Home, TIMES OF INDIA, June 23, 2005, available at
http://timesofmdia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/l150922.cms (reporting on student dress code
for women proposed by Mumbai University Vice-Chancellor Vijay Khole, who stated that the
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This same phenomenon appears in mental illness contexts. We
prefer to think that the mentally ill are faking, or perhaps that they
brought their illness on themselves, for example with drug
addiction.49 Whatever the mechanism, we distance ourselves.50 Our
desire to make ourselves feel both "sane" and "normal" manifests
through differentiation of and hostility toward those whom society
labels mentally ill.51 Conceiving of the mentally ill as irremediably
"other," surely somehow responsible for their own difficulties, we can
rest secure in our own mental health. We right-acting persons will be
safe.
This phenomenon might explain the bizarre reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Clark v. Arizona. The Court analyzed Arizona's
insanity statute and its relationship to the mens rea requirement, and
managed to take a wrong turn at every juncture. Taking the Justices'
intelligence and conscious goodwill as a given, this unconscious
animus toward the mentally ill, resulting from an effort to see them as
"other" and thereby protect ourselves from vulnerability, may be the
only explanation for the Court's irrational reasoning.
II. THE CLARK STORY
A. Everyone Agreed on Everything...
Everyone agreed that Eric Clark was a paranoid schizophrenic, and
everyone agreed that he was suffering from his disease when he shot
Officer Moritz. There is no dispute that Eric had been a happy, well-
adjusted child.5 2 He played football,53 had a girlfriend,5 4 and tested at
or above his grade level academically. 5  About the time he turned
code was in reaction to a recent rape caused by "revealing clothes").
49 Drug use is common among persons with mental illness, but not as a precipitate to their
illness. In Clark, for example, even the prosecution expert had ruled out drug use as a cause of
the schizophrenia. 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 204, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No.
05-5966). Instead, the causal relationship runs the other way: the mentally ill often turn to drugs
in an effort to self-medicate. See, e.g., 1 J.A at 25, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No.
05-5966). As defense expert Dr. Morenz explained in Clark, "the sedating effects help quell
[or]... diminish some of their symptoms." Id.
50 Perlin, supra note 9, at 1425-26.
51 Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories
Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL
L. REv. 313, 436 (2000).
52 Brief of Petitioner at 4, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966), 2006
WL 282168.
53 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 197-98.
54 1 J.A., supra note 49, at 40.
55 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 285.
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fifteen, though, something happened, and no one disputes that, either.
He quit football 56 and became a loner. 57 Standardized tests placed him
at the 4th or 5th grade level.58 He started to dress in multiple layers of
clothing, which he did not change for days at a time.59 His personal
hygiene suffered.60 He would scream, wild-eyed, at no apparent
provocation, or whisper gibberish.61
There is no dispute that Eric believed aliens from outer space had
invaded Flagstaff, nor that Eric believed the aliens wanted to kill
him.62 He strung fishing line around his bedroom and computer room,
booby-trapped with wind chimes and glassware to alert him against
intruders.63 Convinced that his parents, brother, and sister were aliens,
too,64 he refused to eat anything in his home that was not pre-
packaged.65 And he really did keep a bird in his car to test the air,
only to resign himself to its uselessness when the aliens implanted it
with a robotic lung.66
There is no dispute about the Clark family's love for Eric. In one
desperate attempt to get him the help he so clearly needed, his parents
even arranged for him to be arrested.67 This got Eric transferred to a
psychiatric hospital, but he soon returned home, against medical
advice.68 His parents were "frantic., 69 For months they tried to get
Eric recommitted, eventually culminating in a two-day frenzy of
phone calls to their lawyer's office and five different treatment
facilities. 70 They pleaded with their lawyer; he "had to see [them] that
day and Eric was deteriorating so fast that [he] had to figure out a
way to get him some help.
71
Eric did not get help that day.72 Instead, at about four o'clock the
next morning, he began driving his brother's truck around and around
56 Id. at 197-98.
57 Id. at 248; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 5.
58 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 285.
59 Id. at 212.
6 Id.
61 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 4.
62 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 119-20.
63 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 5.
642 J.A., supra note 3, at 119.
65 Id. at 223.
66 Id. at 197, 289-90.
67 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 4.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 6.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 The plight of families trying to navigate our nation's mental health "system" (inaptly
named, as no functional organizational system appears) merits attention in its own right. For an
excellent, comprehensive treatment on the subject, see generally TORREY, supra note 15. The
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the neighborhood, stereo blasting.73 There is no dispute that ever since
his deterioration, Eric had often played the television or stereo "real
loud."
74
B.... Almost
It is here, in the explanations offered for Eric's behavior that
morning, that the stories diverge. The State's theory was that Eric had
the stereo blasting as a way to lure a police officer to the scene. He
had bragged to a friend a few weeks earlier that he would shoot a cop
with a .22,75 and early in the morning on June 21, 2000, that is exactly
what he did.76 The State said Eric knew very well that he had killed a
police officer; they argued that he ran away to avoid getting caught.
After all, the prosecutor argued, Eric stayed hidden for 16 hours,77 he
had thrown away the murder weapon,78 and he gave up only when he
saw the laser sight of the police officer's gun trained on his chest.
79
The defense offered a different explanation. Dr. Morenz, the
defense expert, dismissed the idea that Eric was playing music loudly
because he planned to lure police to the scene. Dr. Morenz said
bluntly, "[Eric] couldn't plan anything." Instead, he explained, it is
common for schizophrenics to turn the sound on televisions and
stereos to high volumes; they are trying to drown out the voices in
their heads.80 Although unwilling to ascribe that motive to Eric, the
press also has tried to raise awareness:
The public health and legal systems prevent desperately sick people from getting
treatment before they commit crimes and then treat them as criminals after they
do .... But getting someone committed is hard-way too hard-and before [Clark's
parents] could do it, [Clark] had shot and killed police officer Jeffrey Moritz. Now
an upstanding law enforcement officer is dead, and someone who should have been a
patient is a criminal .... The real question should be why people like Clark's parents
so often cannot get help before it's too late.
Editorial, Insanity Offense, WASH. POST, April 22, 2006, at A20, 2006 available at WLNR
6756721.
73 1 J.A., supra note 49, at 32.
74 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 5.
75 Brief of Respondent at 3, Clark, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 565617
(citing R.T. 8/7/03, at 8-11 & 16-17).
76 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716; Brief of Respondent, supra note 75, at 5 (citing R.T. 8/7/03,
at 94, 114-15; R.T. 8/8/03, at 33).
77 Brief of Respondent, supra note 75, at 3-4 (noting that the shooting occurred at
approximately 5:00 A.M., and that the police apprehended Eric at approximately 9:00 P.M.).
78 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
79 Brief of Respondent, supra note 75, at 5 (citing R.T. 8/7/03, at 107, 112) (describing
Eric as running from pursuing officers until the laser sight of one officer's weapon "alighted on
Clark's chest").
80 1 J.A, supra note 49, at 32.
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State's expert agreed it was common schizophrenic behavior, and
therefore a possibility.81 The defense maintained that Eric believed
Officer Moritz was an alien. The defense characterized Eric's flight
from the scene as the fear of a paranoid schizophrenic, desperate to
save himself from alien invaders. It pointed to the fact that Eric spent
the day in a neighbor's shed, and was on a route leading toward home
when the police found him. The murder weapon was found on the
ground next to the shed, with no apparent effort having been made to
conceal it-hardly the act of a criminal trying to evade arrest. Eric
was afraid, the defense explained, but of aliens, not law enforcement.
Once arrested, the two sides' stories reconverge. In jail, Eric called
his guards aliens, and hollered his arrest was "all part of the
conspiracy." He stopped eating and drinking,82 not as part of a hunger
strike,83 but out of fear that his alien captors would poison him. In
March 2001, he was found incompetent to stand trial.84 For readers
unfamiliar with that standard, the amount of competence required to
stand trial is terrifically low-famously described as the ability to
"tell the difference between a judge and a grapefruit., 85
Eric was civilly committed and treated for two years before
competency was restored enough to try him.86 Still, Eric's belief in
aliens was unshaken, though his therapy (which included Haldol, an
antipsychotic medication) 87 had succeeded in weakening his paranoia
somewhat. As mentioned earlier, rather than feeling that the aliens
were out to kill him, Eric now believed they were on Earth to further
interplanetary commerce-that "sugar and broccoli" mission.88
Whose version of what Eric was thinking during the disputed
events-while he circled the block with the stereo blaring, when he
shot Officer Moritz, and as he was running away-mattered for two
reasons. First, it mattered because Eric raised an insanity defense.
Second, it mattered because he claims he did not have the mens rea
necessary for guilt in the first place.
81 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 253.
82 Id. at 268.
83 Id.
- Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
85 Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The Colin
Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 25 (1995).
96 Clark's competence was restored in 2003. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
87 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Schizophrenia, NIH Publication No. 06-3517, at 9 (Jan.
2007), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/nimhschizophrenia.pdf
88 Supra text accompanying note 3 (citing 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 120).
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III. THE IRRATIONALITY OF CLARK V. ARIZONA
A. The Insanity Defense: Now Even Shorter!
The first issue addressed in Clark was the constitutional adequacy
of Arizona's insanity defense, which trimmed the traditional two-
pronged formulation down to one prong. Clark asserted that this
failure to conform to tradition deprived him of due process. The Court
held that it did not.89 This Article leaves for others to debate the
ultimate constitutional question,90 and focuses instead on the
reasoning the Court used to arrive at its destination. Following the
conventional wisdom on the matter,91 the Court averred that although
Arizona's statute is a truncated version of the traditional formula
linguistically, the shortened form in fact equals the lengthier one in
meaning.92
This misreading of the statute is the Court's first misstep. The
truncated version of the insanity defense in fact excuses fewer
defendants than the lengthier version does, and the defendant in Clark
89 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2737.
90 Thus far, commentators are uniform in their conclusion that the Clark Court was wrong,
and Arizona's law does in fact work an unconstitutional denial of due process. See, e.g., Allen,
supra note 8, at 140; Peter Westen, The Supreme Court's Bout with Insanity: Clark v. Arizona,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2006); Jennifer Gibbons, Note, Clark v. Arizona: Affirming
Arizona's Narrow Approach to Mental Disease Evidence, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1155, 1167 (2006).
Nor is this uniformity limited to bleeding-heart, ivory-tower types. As then-Attorney
General William French Smith told the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Under any approach, the Government will always be required to prove every element
of the statutory offense that is charged. This includes any specific intent or
knowledge required by statute. In the rare case, therefore, in which a defendant is so
deranged that, for example, he did not know that he was shooting a human being,
one of the elements of the offense could not be proved-the mental element of mens
rea-and he could not be convicted under current law or under any constitutionally
supportable change in the law.
Hearings on Bills to Amend Title 18 to Limit the Insanity Defense Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982) (statement of William French Smith, Att'y Gen. of the
United States).
91 See, e.g., ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 50-51 (1967); 1 W.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE C~iMINAL LAW § 7.2(b)(3), at 536 & § 7.2(b)(4), at 537 (2d ed. 2003).
92 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2722. As the Court put it:
Clark's argument of course assumes that Arizona's former statement of the
M'Naghten rule, with its express alternative of cognitive incapacity, was
constitutionally adequate (as we agree). That being so, the abbreviated rule is no less
so, for cognitive incapacity is relevant under that statement, just as it was under the
more extended formulation, and evidence going to cognitive incapacity has the same
significance under the short form as it had under the long.
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is a good example of someone who is left uncovered by the shorter
version.
1. The Definitions
M'Naghten's Case93 is the venerable English judicial opinion
commonly cited as codifying the insanity defense as it existed in
Victorian times.94 Under M'Naghten:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.95
To be found insane under M'Naghten, then, a defendant must have
been suffering from a mental illness that caused either one of two
outcomes. First, he can prove96 that it caused him not to know "the
nature and quality" of his acts. In other words, the defendant's illness
meant he did not know what he was doing. This is commonly called
the "cognitive" prong of M'Naghten, referring as it does to what
defendants know intellectually.97 Second, the M'Naghten formulation
93 M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
94 See Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test
of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical
Survey, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1250-57 (1966).
95 M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
96 In many jurisdictions, insanity is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the
defendant. The Insanity Defense Reform Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000)), established
insanity as an affirmative defense in federal court:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts.
See also Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2731 (describing various legislatively defined burdens of coming
forward with evidence and burdens of proof concerning the insanity defense). The legislature
also, of course, can require affirmative proof by the State of sanity, for example by the way it
describes a criminal offense. Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 2443-44 (2006).
97 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 375 (4th ed. 2006). The
cognitive prong of the M'Naghten formula is incorporated, along with a volitional prong that is
absent from M'Naghten, into the Model Penal Code: "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). According to the
Model Penal Code's explanatory notes, "An individual's failure to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct may consist in a lack of awareness of what he is doing or a misapprehension of
material circumstances, or a failure to apprehend the significance of his actions in some deeper
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allows, even if the defendant did know what he was doing, that he can
still establish insanity by proving that his illness caused him not to
know that what he was doing was wrong. This is commonly called the
"moral" prong of M'Naghten, referring as it does to a defendant's
capacity to distinguish right and wrong.
98
The Arizona statute used to mirror M'Naghten quite closely. 99
After public outcry over the case of one Mark Austin, however, in
which the killer's acquittal by reason of insanity was followed by a
six-month hospitalization and then release into the community, 100 the
Arizona Legislature passed "Laura's Law,"''1 altering Arizona's
insanity defense. 10 2 The resulting Arizona statute reads in relevant
part, "[a] person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of
the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a
mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did not know
the criminal act was wrong."'1 3 Whereas under M'Naghten and the
former Arizona law either cognitive or moral incapacity would
excuse, this revised Arizona law excuses moral incapacity alone. It is
sense." Id.
98 Platt & Diamond, supra note 94, at 1250-57. The "wrong" in M'Naghten is more
commonly understood to be a moral, rather than a legal, wrong. See Grant H. Morris & Ansar
Haroun, "God Told Me to Kill": Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 973, 1013 & n.
247 (2001) (cataloguing jurisdictions that interpret the M'Naghten "wrong" as either a moral or
a legal transgression). But see State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 493 (Wash. 1983) ("If wrong
[in M'Naghten] meant moral wrong judged by the individual's own conscience, this would
seriously undermine the criminal law, for it would allow one who violated the law to be excused
from criminal responsibility solely because, in his own conscience, his act was not morally
wrong."). The Model Penal Code, supra note 97, permits jurisdictions to opt for either
formulation, in choosing between "criminality" (a legal wrong) and "wrongfulness" (a moral
wrong).
99 The former Arizona Revised Code stated:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct the
person was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to know the nature
and quality of the act or, if such person did know, that such person did not know that
what he was doing was wrong.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (West 1978). See also State v. Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 525
(Ariz. 1965) (describing Arizona law as following M'Naghten 's two-part test).
100 Rende Melangon, Note, Arizona's Insane Response to Insanity, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 287,
290 (1998) (citing Kim Kelliher, Austin, Acquitted in Killing by Reason of Insanity, to Be Freed,
ARiz. DAILY STAR, Aug. 23, 1991, at IA).
101 Named for Austin's wife and victim, Laura Griffin-Austin. See id.
1
0 2 Man Acquitted in Wife's Killing Wants Insanity-Case Rules Lifted, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 14, 1995, at 18D.
10 3 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (West 2001). If the defense is successful, the judge
will order the defendant committed to a mental health facility for the same amount of time the
defendant would have served in prison in the absence of a successful insanity defense. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-502(D).
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this pruning of the cognitive prong to which Clark objected, as it is
that prong that could have excused him.
2. The Holding
In rebuffing Clark's objection, the Court explained that the single-
pronged statute only seems to offer less shelter than the traditional,
two-pronged formulation.1°4 The Court wrote: "evidence going to
cognitive incapacity has the same significance under the short form as
it had under the long"' 5 because "cognitive incapacity is itself
enough to demonstrate moral incapacity."' 10 6 For support, the Court
quoted a variety of sources asserting, in essence, that where
defendants do not know the nature and quality of their acts, they
cannot know their acts were wrong. 0
7
In a footnote, the Court explains that an insanity defendant "must
have understood that he was committing the act charged and that it
was wrongful,"'' 0 8 citing the statutory language in support: "[a] person
may be found guilty except insane if... the person did not know the
criminal act was wrong." It is here that the Court, like the others it
cites, goes astray. The statutory language does not actually require
understanding that he was committing the act charged. The statute
requires that the person did not know "the criminal act" was wrong.
This is different from knowing that one was doing the criminal act.
3. The Otherwise Inexplicable
Conventional wisdom holds that the core of the M'Naghten test is
its moral prong, and that the cognitive prong is redundant. 0 9 As with
so many things, the conventional wisdom here is wrong. A functional
moral compass does not substitute for a functional cognitive one.
104 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2722-23.
1°31d. at 2722.
06Id.
1071d. at 2722-23 (citing State v. Chavez, 693 P.2d 893, 894 (Ariz. 1984)). The Court also
quoted from the Court of Appeals opinion in Clark, 2 J.A., supra note 3, at 350, and from
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 50-51 (1967); 1 W. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2(b)(3), at 536 & § 7.2(b)(4), at 537 (2d ed. 2003); and I R. GERBER,
CRIMINAL LAW OF ARIZONA 502-07, n. 1 (2d ed. 1993).
'0 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2723 n.23.
109See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 375 ("[Alnyone who does not know what she is
doing ... will also 'fail' the right-and-wrong test ...."); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 107, at 50
("[l]f the accused did not know the nature and quality of his act, he would have been incapable
of knowing it was wrong."). See also Judd F. Sneirson, Comment, Black Rage and the Criminal
Law: A Principled Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2251, 2268 (1995)
(observing redundancy in the two M'Naghten prongs).
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The M'Naghten standard reads: "the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."" In
fact, this test lays out two distinct prongs. First, did the defendant not
know what he was doing? To use that hoary old chestnut of Criminal
Law professors, did the defendant, while squeezing the victim's neck,
think he was squeezing a lemon? 11 To use the facts of Clark, did the
defendant, while shooting a police officer, think he was shooting an
alien? If what the defendant believed himself to be doing differs from
what the defendant actually did, then M'Naghten calls him legally
insane.
M'Naghten's second prong applies only if the defendant did know
what he was doing. In these cases, defendants know they are killing
people; in Clark's case, that would mean knowing he was killing a
person who was police officer. In these situations, where the
defendants did know the nature and quality of their acts, M'Naghten
raises the question for which it has become famous: did they know
what they were doing was wrong? Perhaps the defendant, knowing he
is killing a person (even a person who is a police officer), believes
that God has commanded him to do it," 2 or that he must do so to
10M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
1l MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 166 (1962). This far-fetched example's first
appearance in print may have been in an early draft of the Model Penal Code. Heathcoate
Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "'Abolish" the Insanity Defense in S. 1: Squeezing a
Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 712 (1976) (crediting illustration to § 4.01 cmt. 2, tentative
draft No. 4, 1955).
112 For example, deific decree has been enshrined into Washington's insanity law:
A narrow exception to the societal standard of moral wrong has been drawn for
instances wherein a party performs a criminal act, knowing it is morally and legally
wrong, but believing, because of a mental defect, that the act is ordained by God:
such would be the situation with a mother who kills her infant child to whom she is
devotedly attached, believing that God has spoken to her and decreed the act.
Although the woman knows that the law and society condemn the act, it would be
unrealistic to hold her responsible for the crime, since her free will has been
subsumed by her belief in the deific decree.
State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 494 (Wash. 1983) (citations omitted).
For primers on the deific decree, or divine command, defense, see Andrew J. Demko,
Note, Abraham's Deific Defense: Problems with Insanity, Faith, and Knowing Right from
Wrong, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1961 (2005), Jeanine Girgenti, Bridging the Gap Between Law
and Psychology: The Deific Decree, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 10 (2001), Christopher
Hawthorne, Note, "Deific Decree": The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A.
L. Rv. 1755 (2000), and Morris & Haroun, supra note 98. See also Margaret E. Clark,
Comment, The Immutable Command Meets the Unknowable Mind: Deific Decree Claims and
the Insanity Defense After People v. Serravo, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 161 (1992) (commenting on
Colorado case limiting the defense).
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prevent a holocaust, 13 or simply to protect himself"14 or another" 5
from harm. Under these circumstances, a defendant knows the nature
and quality of his acts, but not their wrongfulness. He rightly
comprehends the what; his error lies in the why.' 
16
These are two separate prongs, not collapsible into the one that so
many learned commentators have suggested. Their separateness is
demonstrated by the fact that each can exist without the other. First,
one can know what one is doing but fail to understand that it is a
wrong thing. For example, one might know that one is killing a police
officer but believe it is the right thing to do, perhaps because God
commanded it or because doing so would save the world. This
defendant qualifies under M'Naghten despite failing the first prong.
He understands what he is doing: he is killing a police officer. He
qualifies under M'Naghten because he meets the second prong. He
fails to understand that killing a police officer, at least under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, 1 7 is wrong.
Second, one can fail to know what one is doing while still knowing
that what one is doing is wrong. This sounds more convoluted than it
is. Many commentators assert the contrary, simply stating some
variation of "one can't know what one is doing is wrong unless one
"1 See, e.g., B.C. v. State, 40 S.W.3d 315, 316 (Ark. 2001) (juvenile defendant believed
God had directed him to save the world).
ll4See, e.g., People v. Duckett, 209 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98-99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(defendant believed one victim was the devil and the other a witch, and heard auditory
command hallucinations telling him one victim was going to kill him or have him killed).
"I See, e.g., Trial of Texas Mother Begins Third Week, CNN.com, Mar. 4, 2002,
http://www.courttv.com/trials/yates/030402_cnn.html (Andrea Yates believed that by drowning
her children she would save them from hell, and send them to heaven instead).
16 See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 19 ("[M]ental disorder produces crazy desires
or crazy reasons for action, but it virtually never prevents a defendant from meeting the law's
criteria for... mens rea"). See also id. at 22-23 (illustrating the point that M'Naghten, Andrea
Yates, and a person who hallucinates that God commanded a killing all intended to kill). Id. at
37 (noting that both "cognitive" and "moral" prongs of M'Naghten "are cognitive questions
[that] differ only in the object of the knowledge required").
117 Although the Model Penal Code takes the circumstances as the actor believes them to
be in providing defenses, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (1962), unreasonable beliefs will not
exculpate for recklessness or negligence crimes.
When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is
necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief would establish a
justification under Sections 3.03 to 3.08, but the actor is reckless or negligent in
having such belief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief that
is material to the justifiability of his use of force, the justification afforded by those
Sections is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or
negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Id. § 3.09.
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knows what one is doing" as a self-evident truth before moving on to
their next point."' They are wrong.
One can know very well that x is wrong without realizing that
what one is doing is x. For example, Clark might know very well that
it is wrong to kill police officers. Hence, he knows that what he is in
fact doing is wrong. Unfortunately for him, he did not know that was
what he was doing; he thought he was killing a space alien. His
perfectly accurate knowledge of the wrongfulness of "the criminal
act" (here, killing a police officer) could not help him, because under
the circumstances as he believed them to be, that knowledge was not
relevant. He might also know that it is wrong to steal, or to lie, or to
disrespect one's parents; but since he was not facing any of those
situations, his knowledge of their wrongfulness could not guide him.
Similarly, his knowledge that it is wrong to kill police officers could
not help him, because he did not know he was facing that very
situation. He did not realize he was committing "the criminal act," but
instead believed himself to be doing something else entirely-in this
case, shooting an alien. This defendant qualifies under M'Naghten
despite failing the second prong. He knows what he is doing is wrong:
killing a police officer is wrong. He qualifies under M'Naghten
because he meets the first prong. He fails to understand that what he
is doing is killing a police officer.
States and commentators who have truncated their preferred
insanity tests into a single prong, believing the truncation to make no
difference, have conflated two pieces of knowledge. Fundamentally,
knowledge that what one is actually doing is wrong is different from
knowledge that what one thinks one is doing is wrong.
This is precisely the error at play in Clark. The relevant Arizona
statute reads: "A person may be found guilty except insane if at the
time of the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted
with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did not
know the criminal act was wrong." 119 In this truncated statute, the
only question is whether the defendant knew "the criminal act" was
wrong. If the mental illness is the kind that impairs reality testing,
however, this is hardly a relevant question. While the defendant may
know all sorts of moral truths (e.g., it is wrong to lie, cheat, steal, kill,
and so on), his mental illness prevents him from relating these truths
to what is actually happening.
I 1See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 91, at 50-51; LAFAVE, supra note 91, § 7.2(b)(3), at
536 & § 7.2(b)(4), at 537; Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 38.
I19ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-502(A) (2005).
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Such truncation leads to truly anomalous results. The defendant
who believes he is squeezing lemons may know full well the
wrongfulness of the criminal act. He knows that killing is wrong.
Since he does not realize that is what he is doing, however, his
abstract moral knowledge condemns him. Him the truncated statute
convicts. The defendant who knows he is killing a police officer, on
the other hand, might not know that it is wrong. Maybe he believes
God commanded it, or that it will save the human race from
extinction. In any event, if he does not know the act of killing a police
officer is wrong, then his lack of moral grasp saves him. Him the
truncated statute acquits. Thus, the truncated single-prong formulation
of insanity means punishing the defendant who believes he is
squeezing lemons, while excusing the one who knows he is killing a
police officer.
120
The point of demonstrating this absurdity is not to argue that we
are wrong to excuse defendants who have cognitive, but not moral,
understanding of their actions. The defendant who kills a police
officer believing God commanded it, or that his action would save the
world, is not a responsible moral agent deserving of punishment.
12
Instead, the point is that if we are right to excuse these defendants-
and indeed we are-then surely we must excuse the defendant who
does not even realize he is killing anyone. The Clark Court has
perpetuated a mistake in validating the idea that M'Naghten's two
prongs are redundant. Unfortunately for Eric and others like him, and
unfortunately for the philosophical grounding of our criminal justice
system, this mistake denies legal protection to precisely that class of
insane defendants who are the least culpable.
B. Mental Illness and Mens Rea: Can This Marriage Be Saved?
The second issue addressed in Clark is the relationship between
the insanity defense and the mens rea requirement. The trial judge in
Clark announced that he would not consider evidence of Clark's
mental illness on the issue of mens rea because the Arizona Supreme
Court case, Arizona v. Mott,' 22 forbade it. 123 Under Mott, the trial
120To the extent that this is not the result, and that both kinds of defendants are equally
likely to be acquitted by reason of insanity, it only means that jurors and judges have fallen
victim to the same conflation as the commentators. The statute's plain meaning calls for the
absurd result.
121 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 822
(2003) ("Only a blameworthy moral agent deserves punishment at all ... ").
122 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) habeas corpus granted sub nom. Mott v. Stewart,
2002 WL 31017646 (D. Ariz. 2002)).
123 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2717 (quoting State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051).
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judge said, "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental
disorder short of insanity . . . to negate the mens rea element of a
crime."' 124 The trial judge permitted this evidence to go to the
affirmative defense of insanity, but not to disprove mens rea. 125 In his
second assignment of error on appeal, Clark claimed that this rule
denied him the right to present a defense.
1. The Definitions
Clark was convicted under a statute reading: "A person commits
first degree murder if ... [i]ntending or knowing that the person's
conduct will cause death to a law enforcement officer, the person
causes the death of a law enforcement officer who is in the line of
duty.,, 126 Two elements thus turn a run-of-the-mill murder into a first-
degree murder: the death must occur while the officer is on duty, and
the killer must know that the victim is a police officer. No doubt
Officer Moritz was on duty when Clark killed him. The officer had
arrived in Clark's neighborhood in response to 911 calls reporting the
blaring stereo in the wee hours of the morning. Officer Moritz was in
uniform and the lights on his patrol car were flashing. The fact that
the officer was on duty is not in dispute. Instead, Clark claims he did
not know it was a police officer. Thus, Clark wanted to offer evidence
of his mental illness to support his claim that he lacked one of the
elements of the statute: the mens rea of knowledge that the victim was
a police officer.
The reasons Clark would offer on this point depend on evidence of
his mental illness. Although a normal person would have recognized
that Officer Moritz was a police officer-again, the uniform, patrol
car, and flashing lights-Clark's paranoid schizophrenia meant that
he believed those things were all part of an elaborate ruse. Aliens had
taken over Flagstaff, impersonating government agents and other
authority figures, and Clark believed Officer Moritz was just another
alien.
Given that self-same uniform and patrol car, the fact-finder may
have found this difficult to believe, but the Supreme Court's ruling in
Clark means Clark properly was prevented even from making the
argument. In other words, the statute requires knowledge that the
victim was a police officer, and this case denies the defendant the
124 Id.
125 d. at 2717 n.3 (permitting the evidence to be introduced at all only because "it goes to
the insanity issue and because we're not in front of a jury").
126 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(3) (2005).
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opportunity to show he did not have that knowledge. The government
put on its evidence to that effect (uniform, patrol car, flashing lights),
but the defendant (whose evidence would explain how although a
normal person would have known it was a police officer under those
circumstances, he did not) may not offer his. Clark claimed this
violates due process by denying him the opportunity to present a
defense.
2. The Holding
The Court disagreed, explaining that the rule articulated in Mott is
a constitutional one.12 7 First, the Court described three "categories of
evidence with a potential bearing on mens rea."1 28 "Observational
evidence," as one might guess, refers to a witness's observations.
1 29
These might include testimony that a witness saw Clark string the
fishing line around his room, or heard him talk about aliens or play
the stereo at disturbingly loud volumes. This kind of evidence, the
Court said, is not restricted to proving insanity, and also may be
offered on the issue of mens rea.1
30
Next, the Court described "mental-disease evidence," or a
witness's opinion that the defendant suffered from a particular mental
disease. 131 Lastly, the Court described "capacity evidence," referring
to testimony about a defendant's "capacity for cognition and moral
judgment (and ultimately also his capacity to form mens rea).
These two, "mental-disease evidence" and "capacity evidence," are
both opinion evidence.133 Rather than reporting facts observed, these
last two offer interpretations of those facts: the first determining that,
in light of the symptoms observed, the defendant suffers from a
127 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716, 2724.
128 Id. at 2724.
1291d. ("testimony from those who observed what Clark did and heard what he said").
Oddly, the Clark majority wrote that "this category would also include testimony that an expert
witness might give about Clark's tendency to think in a certain way and his behavioral
characteristics." Id.
130ld. at 2724-25 ("This evidence.., is the kind of evidence that can be relevant to show
what in fact was on Clark's mind when he fired the gun.").
131 Id. at 2725.
1321d. As Professor Morse and Judge Hoffman rightly point out, the focus on a defendant's
"capacity" is puzzling from the beginning:
If an agent lacks the capacity to do something, it follows that the agent did not do it
in fact .... But asking about a defendant's capacity to form a mental state never
provides better information than inquiring directly whether the requisite mens rea
was formed in fact, which is the ultimate legal question.
Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 20.
133 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2725.
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particular mental illness, and the second commenting on what effect
this had on the defendant's mental state. 134 In Clark's case, that would
be the experts' testimony that Clark was suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia ("mental disease evidence") and what effect that
disease had on Clark's capacity to stay in touch with reality, to know
what was going on and what he was doing, and his capacity to know
right from wrong ("capacity evidence"). 135 Mental-disease evidence
and capacity evidence, the Court concluded, were restricted by Mott
to proving insanity, and may not be used to show a lack of mens
rea. 
136
The Court gave two reasons why Mott's restriction is permissible.
First, the Court explained, while the State bears the burden of proving
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including mens
rea, 137 legislatures can require defendants to bear the burden of
proving insanity. 38 When mental disease and capacity evidence are
admitted on mens rea, the Court said, the effect is to erase the
difference. Instead of requiring that the defendant establish insanity
by clear and convincing evidence, a difficult hurdle to leap, the same
evidence in a mens rea context need only establish reasonable
doubt. 39 States have a right to require that their chosen burden of
proof be met without subversion,1 40 the Court said, and permitting
evidence about mental illness to go to mens rea would subvert that
choice. Second, the Court explained, "well-established rules of
evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value
is outweighed by ... confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead
14Id.
135 The Clark majority asserts that mental disease and capacity evidence will come from
experts "characteristically but not always." Id. at 2725 & nn. 28-29. It certainly would be
unusual for a lay witness to be in a position to offer this sort of evidence, given the evidentiary
requirements:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702 [Testimony by Experts].
FED R. EVID. 701.
136 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2726.
1371d. at 2729 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970)).
138 Id. at 2731 ("Or a jurisdiction may place the burden of persuasion on a defendant to
prove insanity....").
1391d. at 2725-29, 31.
141d. at 2732-33.
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the jury.' 4' "And if evidence may be kept out entirely, its
consideration may be subject to limitation .... ,,42 This limitation is
justified, the Court reasoned, because mental-disease evidence and
capacity evidence are both suspect. 143
This section explores several additional confusions perpetuated by
the Court in its analysis of the relationship between the mens rea
requirement and the insanity defense. The Court disserves future
insanity law in three ways: (a) by cataloging relevant evidence into
observational, mental-illness, and capacity evidence, (b) by imagining
a burden shift, and (c) by casting aspersions on expert testimony in
insanity cases.
3. The Otherwise Inexplicable
a. Observational, Mental-Illness, and Capacity Evidence
First, the Court's breakdown of relevant evidence into
observational, mental-disease, and capacity categories has no basis in
anything that has come before.' 44 The Court claims Clark failed to
"apprise the Arizona courts that he believed the trial judge had
erroneously limited the consideration of observation evidence ...
This sort of evidence was not covered by the Mott restriction, and
confining it to the insanity issue would have been an erroneous
application of Mott as a matter of Arizona law. 145 This is quite a
statement, since no division of evidence into "observational,"
"mental-disease," and "capacity" types existed until the Court
conjured those terms into being in Clark. As Justice Kennedy wrote
in dissent:
[T]he Court's tripartite structure is something not addressed
by the state trial court, the state appellate court, counsel on
either side in those proceedings, or the briefs the parties filed
with us. The Court refuses to consider the key part of Clark's
claim because his counsel did not predict the Court's own
invention. It is unrealistic, and most unfair, to hold that
Clark's counsel erred in failing to anticipate so novel an
approach. 146
141Id. at 2732 (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2006)).
142 Id.
143d. at 2734 (noting the risks that accompany both types of evidence).
144d. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145Id. at 2727.
146 Id. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Indeed, it may be overly demanding to expect Clark to have
anticipated this novel taxonomy and crafted his objections and appeal
around it. For the Court to fault defense counsel for failing to object,
not to the wholesale exclusion of evidence about his client's mental
illness, but specifically to the exclusion of "observation" evidence, as
opposed to "mental disease and capacity" evidence, takes real
chutzpah: these categories did not exist until the Court birthed them in
its opinion, nearly three years after the trial counsel would have had
to object. 147
In addition, the distinctions the Court draws among these types of
evidence is elusive at best. Fundamentally, the Court's unrestricted
"observation" evidence differs from its restricted-use "mental
disease" and "capacity" evidence in the same way that evidence based
on personal knowledge 148 differs from evidence of "opinion or
inference"-which is to say, it does not differ much.
49
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence (as well as those of
every other jurisdiction with analogous rules of evidence) addressed
this very distinction in 1972.150 When the witness is a layperson,151
evidence rules permit opinion and inference to the same extent as any
other testimony, so long as there is a rational basis in personal
knowledge for the opinion and it will be helpful to explain the
witness's testimony.
52
147 The Supreme Court released its opinion in Clark on June 29, 2006; Clark's trial
occurred in August 2003. See I J.A., supra note 49, at I (noting relevant docket entries).
148 FED. R. EVID. 602 ("Lack of Personal Knowledge. A witness may not testify to a matter
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of
the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion
testimony by expert witnesses.").
149 Cf Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 43 ("All clinical judgments are, by their very
nature, informed not just by the clinician's observation of the particular patient being seen, but
by the accumulated wisdom of observations of other patients by themselves and other clinicians
and by the findings from empirical studies.").
5The United States Supreme Court submitted the proposed Rules to Congress on
November 20, 1972. Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 684 & n.55
(2000).
151 When the witness is an expert, opinions are again permitted, so long as they are based
on sufficient facts using good science applied soundly. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("Testimony by
Experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if(l) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case."). See discussion of expert witness opinions infra
at Part III.B.3.c.
152 FED. R. EVID. 701 ("Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. If the witness is not
testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
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The reasons for this are common-sense. First, the difference
between personally observed facts and opinions or inferences is
perhaps less clear than one might imagine. A witness who testifies "I
saw Dick Clark in Times Square on New Year's Eve," might think
she is only reporting what she saw-"just the facts, ma'am" as
Sergeant Friday might have implored on Dragnet.1 13 But if we were to
examine her closely, what did she really personally observe? She saw
what looked like a human being, about the same height, weight, facial
structure, coloring, mannerisms, and so on, as she associates with
Dick Clark. In her opinion (or according to her inference), what she
was observing was the man himself, rather than someone who looked
like Dick Clark, a hallucination, or a hologram. And of course this
exercise can be repeated with any "fact" observed. Anything a
witness "saw" is in fact nothing more than a combination of physical
input to her nervous system and interpretation of those inputs.1 54 So
the difference between observations and opinions or inferences is not
so clear as it might seem.
Furthermore, even if we could identify a stopping point where
witnesses truly were simply relating their unmediated observations,
such testimony by witnesses would not make terribly useful evidence.
To take the stand and say, "I saw what looked like a man, of x height
and y weight with z facial structure" will only bewilder the jury
tasked with deciding whether Dick Clark was in Times Square on
New Year's Eve. To put it bluntly, "just the facts, ma'am" does a
lousy job of explaining what the witness observed. To meaningfully
communicate, we must constantly relate our inferences and opinions
to mediate and explain our observations.
155
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Rule 702.").153 This famous truncated form of the interrogation actually comes from a Dragnet spoof,
not from the famous television series. STAN FREBERG, Little Blue Riding Hood, on ST. GEORGE
AND THE DRAGONET (Capitol Records 1953).
15'A. DAVID MILNER & MELVYN A. GOODALE, THE VisuAL BRAIN IN ACTION 1-3
(1996).
155 "It makes little sense to divorce the observation evidence from the explanation that
makes it comprehensible-namely, expert psychiatric testimony." Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2739
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). For the Court to resurrect a distinction between what is observed and
what is inferred in the case of mental illness is odd, but not unheard of. A similar unworkable
distinction, done away with by the Rules drafters and later resurrected by Congress, is that
concerning testimony by witnesses on the "ultimate issue." See FED. R. EVID. 704 & discussion
infra at Part II.B.3.c.
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Since observations of the mentally ill will make more sense when
mediated by opinion testimony, mental disease evidence and capacity
evidence should be permitted. This is particularly true when the
subject matter is appropriate for an expert, as mental disease and
capacity evidence commonly will be.'56 For example, testimony that
Eric Clark listened to the stereo, television, and so on at loud volumes
presumably would be admissible as "observation" evidence. Its
potential significance would be lost on the jury, however, in the
absence of an expert who could explain that persons suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia often do these things to drown out the voices
they hear.' 57 When attempting to divine what mental state a defendant
had, especially, expert opinions and inferences mediating
observations will be most helpful to a fact-finder, and should be
permitted.
b. Burden Shift
Regardless, the Court went on to hold that Arizona (and other
states that do likewise) is constitutionally permitted to restrict use of
mental disease and capacity evidence to the affirmative defense of
insanity, not allowing it to be used to disprove mens rea. The Court
reasoned that to permit the evidence on mens rea effectively changes
the burden of proof on an insanity defense. To show insanity in
Arizona, the defendant must provide clear and convincing evidence.
To defeat the prosecution's burden on mens rea, the defendant needs
to raise only a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court fretted in Clark,
allowing evidence of mental illness on mens rea effectively allows the
defendant to substitute the easier burden of raising reasonable doubt
for the harder one of establishing clear and convincing evidence.
Here, too, the Court sows confusion. Allowing evidence of mental
illness on mens rea does not change the burden of proof on insanity at
all.' 58  The difficulty arises from a misunderstanding of the
relationship between insanity and mens rea. These are two different
156 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
e 1 IJ.A., supra note 49, at 32. Analogously, what looks to police or prosecution like
consciousness of guilt regarding a crime might in fact be a paranoid schizophrenic's reaction to
seeing anyone approach at any time. Professor Morse and Judge Hoffman provide yet another
example. "[A] psychotically disorganized person gets lost.., and cannot find his way home. To
escape the cold, he breaks into a building.., and is charged with burglary on the theory that he
intended to steal." Morse & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 24. An expert's testimony regarding the
defendant's mental state in such as case could assist the jury in understanding that what might
otherwise look like a burglary is really only a lost person trying to stay warm. Id.
'58But see Allen, supra note 8, at 137-39 (agreeing to "potential conflict" in burdens of
proof, though ultimately concluding such conflict "is entirely beside the point"); Westen, supra
note 90, at 159 (asserting necessary contradiction in requiring such burdens ofproof).
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things. Although both might be at issue at trial, and although the same
evidence might go to prove both, they are not interchangeable. 159 The
Clark majority, in rejecting the argument that mens rea and insanity
are entirely distinguishable,1 60  misunderstands. In fact, the
prosecution must prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
defendant in Arizona who wishes to raise an insanity defense must
prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. These are two
different points.
To illustrate the separateness of these inquiries, some background
is helpful. To be guilty of a crime, an actor must satisfy three
elements: actus reus, mens rea, and a lack of defenses.'16  In other
words, the actor must have committed the prohibited act 62 with the
prohibited mental state1 63 and it must also be true that no defenses
apply.
The first task of the prosecutor is to demonstrate that the actor
committed the prohibited act.164 The defendant charged with murder
must have killed a human being;165 the defendant charged with arson
must have started a fire; 166 and so on for any other enumerated
167
criminal behavior. If the defendant did not commit the prohibited act,
there can be no conviction.1 68 Needless to say, caveats and counter-
examples abound: whether possession is properly considered an "act"
or a "status"; 169 the sufficiency of the small amount of act required for
159 "[T]he mens rea issue is entirely distinct from the legal insanity issue, even if precisely
the same evidence would be relevant to adjudicating both claims." Morse & Hoffman, supra
note 6, at 32.
160 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2731 n.38 (2006).
161 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 91 (discussing actus reus and mens rea), 217
(discussing defenses).
162 The actus reus is conduct that "includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an
act of which he is physically capable." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0 1(1) (2001).
163 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (2001) ("[A] person is not guilty of an offense
unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with
respect to each material element of the offense.").
'6Note, though, that the jury need not agree on what prohibited act the defendant
committed. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 632 (1991).
165For example, the murder statute at issue in Clark requires that a murder defendant
"cause[ ] the death of another person, including an unborn child ... " ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1105(A) (2005).
16See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) ("Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to
damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive ... ").
167The prohibited behavior must be previously enumerated to satisfy principles of legality.
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMaTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 72 (1968) ("[N]o one may be
convicted of or punished for an offense unless the conduct constituting the offense has been
authoritatively defined by an institution having the duly allocated competence to do so.").
16 Even for strict liability offenses, a defendant can raise as a defense the failure of the
prima facie case-i.e., that he did not do the act or acts constituting the crime. Sanford H.
Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 258 (1987).
169 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, The Relevance of the Concept of Action to the Criminal
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the inchoate crimes of solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt; 170 and
those circumstances under which the act of becoming an accomplice
or a co-conspirator will suffice to hold one person accountable for
additional, uncontemplated and unassisted acts of another,171 to name
just a few. Generally speaking, however, the criminal law requires an
act. 172
The second task of the prosecutor is to demonstrate that the actor
committed the prohibited act with the prohibited mental state.
173
There are four generally accepted levels of mens rea: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. 174 For example, the actor
charged with murder must have intentionally killed;' 75 the actor
charged with murdering a police officer must have known the victim
to be a police officer;' 76 and so on for any other mens rea
requirements. As with the actus reus, there are caveats and counter-
examples: some offenses, like traffic violations177 and regulatory
infractions 178 -and, interestingly, the transmission of sexual
Law, 6 CRIM. L.F. 327, 333 (1995).
170 Dressler, supra note 97, at § 27.01 (describing de-emphasized role of actus reus in
inchoate crimes). See also PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § V.1, at 612 (1997) (describing
minimal actus reus requirement as demarking "the outer limits of the reach of criminal law").
171 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (affirming liability of co-conspirator in
tax fraud by principal, despite co-conspirator's residence in federal penitentiary when principal
committed fraud); People v. Durham, 449 P.2d 198, 201-02, 207 (Cal. 1969) (affirming
accomplice liability for killing committed by principal, despite accomplice's cowering with
hands up while principal shot victim).
172 But see Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 60 (Antony Duff ed., 1998); Husak, supra note
169 (reviewing MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993)).
173 See, e.g., Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox C.C. 550 (Ir. Cr. Cas. Res. 1877) (holding that to
convict a sailor for starting a fire aboard his ship, prosecution must show intent to set fire,
illustrating now-conventional sentiment against convicting defendants who lack the necessary
mens rea).
174 E.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-46 (1978).
175E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(I) (2005) ("A person commits first degree
murder if: Intending... that the person's conduct will cause death .... ").
176 E.g., id. § 13-1105(A)(3) (providing that first-degree murder is committed if "knowing
that the person's conduct will cause death to a law enforcement officer, the person causes the
death of a law enforcement officer who is in the line of duty.").
177 E.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-1 (2006) ("No person may drive or be in actual
physical control of any vehicle while... [t]here is 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in
that person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of that person's breath, blood, or other bodily
substance .... "). See also Douglas Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate
Offenses, 37 ARIZ. L REv. 151, 176 (1995) (suggesting that moving violations are generally
treated as strict liability offenses).
178 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12303 (2000) ("Any person, firm, or corporation who, within
this state, possesses any destructive device, other than fixed ammunition of a caliber greater
than .60 caliber, except as provided by this chapter, is guilty of a public offense and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed
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diseases179-are committed when the prohibited act is committed in
the absence of any defense, regardless of the mental state of the
actor. 180 Generally speaking, however, the criminal law also requires
a mental state.'1
8
If either of these two elements is missing, there has been no crime
at all. 182 The presence of both, however, does not guarantee a
conviction. Only when these two elements of a crime are present does
the inquiry move on to whether the defendant had any defenses. In
other words, the fact that a defense is relevant at all means that both
the actus reus and the mens rea elements have been satisfied.
183
The burden is on the prosecution to establish actus reus and mens
rea beyond a reasonable doubt. 184 Thus, the prosecution in Clark must
establish not only that Clark killed Officer Moritz, but that he killed
him "intending or knowing that [his] conduct will cause death to a
one year, or in state prison, or by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by both
such fine and imprisonment."). Environmental law is rife with examples of strict criminal
liability. See generally Charles J. Babbitt, et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of
Environmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2004).
179 E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-519 (2004) ("It shall be unlawful and a felony for any
person, after becoming an infected person and before being discharged and pronounced cured
by a physician in writing, to marry any other person, or to expose any other person by the act of
copulation or sexual intercourse to such venereal disease or to liability to contract the venereal
disease.").
180 "Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
181 E.g., United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating
that "mens rea is an essential element of any criminal offense"). But see Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
at 281 (concerning strict liability criminal offenses).
182 As Justice Kennedy put it, if Clark did not know he was killing a police officer, he
"need[ed] no excuse, as then he did not commit the crime as Arizona defines it." Clark, 126 S.
Ct. at 2743 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183 Of course, one can speak accurately enough of the lack of proof of either actus reus or
mens rea as a "defense," in the sense that lack of proof of either element will defeat conviction.
E.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21 (2007). For present purposes,
however, the word "defense" denotes either a justification or an excuse.
Justifications include situations wherein although the actor committed the actus reus with
the requisite mens rea, accompanying circumstances were such that society would agree the
actor did the right thing. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 483 (1997). An example of a
justification defense would be necessity, or the lesser-of-two-evils defense, DRESSLER, supra
note 97, at § 22.01. Excuses include situations where, although the actor committed the actus
reus with the requisite mens rea, something about the circumstances or the actor were such that
society would not feel it appropriate the blame the actor. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the
Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 958 (1985). An example of an excuse defense would be
infancy, where the actor is too young to be considered a fair object of blame. But see Mitchell
N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (arguing that
this consensus among academics concerning the difference between justification and excuse is
wrong).
19Jn re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 368; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987).
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law enforcement officer." Only after the government meets this
burden is the question posed: but is the defendant a "moral agent"?
85
Perhaps, despite having both actus reus and mens rea, this defendant
does not deserve punishment. Perhaps something about this defendant
makes it unfair, or inhumane, to punish him.
That something is left to the States to define and Arizona, like
many others, includes insanity among its excusing conditions.'
86
Should a defendant wish to claim insanity, the burden lies with him to
raise the issue and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
meets the test for insanity. 87 Here is where the confusion arises. The
same mental illness or capacity evidence can go to prove both the
lack of mens rea and the presence of an insanity defense, and the
different burdens of proof for each rings alarm bells for the Court. 1
88
The alarm is unnecessary.
This concern regarding dual-purpose evidence leads the Court to
conclude that mental-illness and capacity evidence may be properly
banned from consideration of mens rea. Oddly enough, if the
evidence can only be admissible on the ground of either mens rea or
insanity but not both, it makes more sense to declare it inadmissible
as to insanity. If Arizona's insanity statute really lacks a cognitive
prong, then the fact that Clark did not know what he was doing is
irrelevant to his insanity claim. Only if Clark does not know that
killing a police officer is wrong should he have a defense under the
truncated statute; and it is unclear that his symptoms meant that. He
may very well have known it was wrong to kill police officers; his
defense is that he did not know that was what he was doing.
Therefore, the Clark Court has it exactly backwards. If the Arizona
insanity statute is to be given its natural reading, evidence about Eric
Clark's mental state should not have been admitted on it, but only on
the issue of mens rea.' 89 As the law stands in Arizona, defendants
who did not know that their victims were police officers will be
18 5 E.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501 (1844) (explaining that to
be the subject of criminal conviction, "a person must have [sufficient] intelligence and
capacity ... to have a criminal intent and purpose... a conscious or controlling mental power[,
that is, one must be a] responsible moral agent").
186 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (West 2001).
187 See, e.g., id. § 13-502(C).
188 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2732-35.
189 There is some support for this approach. See, e.g., State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan.
2003) (collecting cases and literature on mens rea approach); BoNNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW
624 (2d ed. 2004) (describing efforts to abolish the insanity defense on the ground that evidence
of mental illness should be admitted only on the issue of mens rea). See also Morse & Hoffman,
supra note 6, at 51 (arguing that since mens rea question is one of "empirical fact" rather than
insanity's question of "moral responsibility," expert testimony is more appropriate and less
likely to mislead in mens rea context).
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acquitted-unless the reason they did not know was a mental illness,
in which case we convict.1 90
More to the point, of course, is that the dual-purpose nature of the
evidence in Clark should ring no alarm bells at all. The fact that the
same evidence might prove two different points in a trial is not unique
to insanity. For example, testimony that the defendant in an
automobile accident told a friend, "My brakes are bad," is evidence of
two different points, both of which must be proven. First, the fact that
the defendant said "My brakes are bad" goes to prove that the
defendant knew her brakes were bad. This knowledge will allow the
plaintiff to satisfy the burden of proving that the defendant breached
her duty: a reasonable person who knew her brakes were bad would
have had them fixed. Because the defendant knew her brakes were
bad and did not fix them, she breached her duty in a way she might
not have if she did not know about the problem. 19' Second, the fact
that the defendant said "My brakes are bad" goes to prove that her
brakes were, in fact, bad. As an admission by a party opponent, 92 this
statement will be admissible for "the truth of the matter asserted."'
' 93
This fact allows the plaintiff to satisfy the burden of proving that the
defendant caused the accident: the reason the cars collided was the
defendant's bad brakes. Thus, the same evidence can be used to prove
two different points in a case, breach and causation. Should the
plaintiff convince the fact-finder that the plaintiff uttered these words,
both breach and causation would be supported by the evidence. If the
fact-finder rejects the plaintiff's version, both issues remain
unproven. In neither case does the dual-use nature of the evidence
offered change the burden of proof required. The fact that both issues
need to be shown, and that the same evidence might be used to prove
each, does not change the burden of proof.
Evidence of mental illness or capacity is no different. Testimony
that Clark is a paranoid schizophrenic, and what that means for his
understanding regarding the people around him, is evidence of two
I-" Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2747-48 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
19 Compare Louis v. Youngren, 138 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (holding
admission that, "My brakes were defective; they wouldn't hold and I couldn't stop the truck"
creates a jury question on whether truck's owner is liable to injured party in negligence), with
Hackett v. Perron, 402 A.2d 193, 194 (N.H. 1979) (affirming defense verdict on theory of
"sudden and unexpected brake failure" where defendant neither knew nor had reason to know of
his defective brakes). See also People v. Contreras, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 757, 763 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (affirming murder conviction based on finding of implied malice where tow-truck driver
with numerous citations who knew his truck had bad brakes killed his victim as he raced his
truck, at times becoming airborne, to beat another towing operator to a tow job).
'9 FED. R. EVtD. 801 (d)(2).
193 FED. R. EVID. 80 1(c).
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different points, both of which must be proven. First, the fact that
Clark is a paranoid schizophrenic who does not know the difference
between people and aliens goes to prove he did not have the required
mens rea-he did not know Officer Moritz was a police officer.
Second, the schizophrenia goes to prove that even if he had the mens
rea, he is not a moral agent deserving of punishment.
In the bad brakes case, both breach and causation are established at
once if the fact-finder accepts the defendant's story. Similarly in
Clark, both lack of mens rea and presence of insanity are established
at once if the fact-finder accepts the defendant's story. Why this
should trouble the Court in an insanity context but not in any other
context is unclear.
The proffered explanation-that this effectively removes the
burden of proving insanity from the defendant to show by clear and
convincing evidence, and places it on the prosecution to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt-withers under scrutiny. It makes equal
sense to describe the Clark scenario as effectively removing the
burden of proving mens rea from the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt, and placing it on the defendant to show by clear and
convincing evidence. Were this the perspective adopted by the Court,
the unconstitutionality of the maneuver would be clear., 94 There is no
difference in the analysis. Both must be shown, and each can be
proven by the same evidence. The Court casts this as an either-or, and
chooses the perspective that again criminalizes the non-culpable.
Either the status of the defendant's knowledge that Officer Moritz
was a police officer must be shown by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt for all purposes or it must be shown by the
defendant by clear and convincing evidence for all purposes. As
between these two options, the Court unblinkingly requires the latter
without seeming to realize the options are two sides of the same coin.
Requiring the defendant to prove his lack of knowledge effectively
removes the burden of proving knowledge from the prosecution. This
the Constitution does not allow. For the Court to fail to see that its
194"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, conforming to sub nom. W.v. Family
Court, 262 N.E.2d 675 (N.Y. 1970). Differentiating between the elements of the crime and
affirmative defenses, the Court has permitted burden-shifting only for the latter. E.g., Martin v.
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233 (1987) (no violation of due process to place burden of proving self-
defense by a preponderance on defendant); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 200, 202
(1977), denying reh'g, 481 U.S. 1024 (1986) (State can require murder defendant to prove by
preponderance affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance).
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analysis precisely mirrors the analysis it wholeheartedly rejects in
other contexts can be explained only by the emotional clouding that
comes from consideration of insanity.
c. Expert Testimony
Lastly, the Court does a disservice to the mentally ill and to society
as a whole when it rests its decision so heavily on its disdain for
mental health experts' testimony.195 Once again, the concern alarming
the Court is hardly unique to insanity. "Battles of the experts" are
phenomena broadly known throughout different aspects of American
legal culture, 196 and the phrase "hired gun" has been applied to
opposing experts in any number of contexts.' 97 But this image is
uniquely inapposite to insanity cases:
Contrary to popular impressions, the bulk of expert
psychiatric evidence presented at criminal trials does not
concern novel, controversial theories, but is routine testimony
on more common and generally accepted mental diseases
such as schizophrenia. For example, paranoid schizophrenia,
the disease at issue in Clark, ranks among the least
controversial and best understood of mental diseases, and it
was uncontested that Clark suffered from the disease at the
time of the killing.
98
195 See Allen, supra note 8, at 140. See also The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading
Cases, Constitutional Law, Due Process, Required Scope of Insanity Defense, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 223, 232 (2006) ("Ultimately, Arizona's rule, and the Court's endorsement of it, are
understandable only through recognition of the judiciary's deep skepticism of psychiatry.").
196E.g., Lake v. Clark, 533 So. 2d 797, 799 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) ("A medical
malpractice case is always necessarily a battle of expert witnesses."); Jason S. Kirwan, Note,
Appraising a Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of Specific Performance in Real
Estate Contracts, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 697, 711-12 (2005) (real estate appraisals); Eifion
Phillips, Comment, Phillips v. AWH Corp.: Reemphasizing Context in Patent Claim
Construction, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 957, 985-86 (2006) (patent infringements).
19 7 DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 10.3.1
(2004) (collecting and summarizing criticism of party-retained expert witnesses). See also FED.
R. EVID. 706 Advisory Committee Note ("The practice of shopping for experts ... [has] been
[a] matter[ ] of deep concern."). As Judge Posner claimed, "many experts are willing for a
generous (and sometimes for a modest) fee to bend their science in the direction from which
their fee is coming." Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd.
P'ship, 34 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994) (trademark case). See generally Stephen D. Easton,
Ammunition for the Shoot-out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full Expert
Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465 (2000); Jennifer A. Turner, Going After the "Hired
Guns": Is Improper Expert Witness Testimony Unprofessional Conduct or the Negligent
Practice of Medicine?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 275 (2006).
198 The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, Due Process,
Required Scope ofInsanity Defense, 120 HARV. L. REV. 223, 229 (2006) (citations omitted).
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As Professor Michael Perlin pointed out a decade ago, there is
incredible unanimity among defense and prosecution experts with
respect to a defendant's mental illness: 199 "[o]n the average, there is
examiner agreement in eighty-eight percent of all insanity cases.9'200 It
also bears mention that the incentive to malinger is questionable.
Verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity can result in longer
sentences than criminal convictions,20 1 and readily-understandable
psychological and sociological forces discourage persons with mental
illness from acknowledging that they are sick.2°2
This would not be the first time special rules were crafted for
mental illness. Courts used to forbid testimony going to the
"ultimate issue" on the grounds that that was for the fact-finder. 0 3
199 Perlin, supra note 9, at 1405 n.195 (citing Joseph H. Rodriguez et al., The Insanity
Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 404
(1983), and Michael R. Hawkins & Richard A. Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing
the Insanity Plea, 53 PSYCHOL. REP. 191, 194 (1983) (citing studies)).
2001d. at 1405 n.196 (citing Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., Insanity Defenses: Contested or
Conceded?, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885, 885-86 (1984), and Kenneth Fukunaga et al., Insanity
Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and Concordance of Psychiatric Opinion and Court Verdict, 5
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325, 326 (1981)). Professor Fukunaga reported that there was unanimous
agreement in 92% of the cases concerning the mental state of the defendant. Id. The American
Psychiatric Association claims that the diagnostic concurrence rate among psychiatrists is
approximately 80%. American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense 7
(1983), reprinted in 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 683 (1983). Still others estimate the rate at
90%. See, e.g., Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1983)
(statement of Melvin Sabshin, M.D., chief executive officer of the American Psychiatric
Association). But see George J. Alexander, International Human Rights Protection Against
Psychiatric Political Abuses, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 387, 392-93 & n. 20 (1997) (citing
studies showing diagnostic concurrence rate among psychiatrists to be quite low-in the
neighborhood of 300/-and claiming mental illness is generally "over-predict[ed]"). Whatever
the true concurrence rate, one wonders:
why, when psychiatrists disagree, [is it] proof positive that they don't know what
they're talking about and it demeans the profession; while, when our Supreme Court
decides the law of the land by a disagreement of 5-4, they are scholars dealing with
profound, difficult, and complicated issues and one must respect their differences in
judgment[?]
JACQUES M. QUEN ET AL., RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE, IN LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONS 235, 247 (Walter E. Barton & Charlotte J. Sanborn eds., 1978).201 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
202 Perlin, supra note 9, at 1412 (stating much greater likelihood of"feign[ing] sanity in an
effort not to be seen as mentally ill, even where such evidence might serve as powerful
mitigating evidence[, as] in death penalty cases"). In addition to the urge to protect one's self-
image and societal reputation against the threat of being labeled "insane," refusal to
acknowledge that one is mentally ill is a symptom of mental illness itself, called anosognosia.
For a highly readable and compassionate discussion of the subject, see generally XAVIER F.
AMADOR, I AM NOT SICK I DON'T NEED HELP! How TO HELP SOMEONE WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS ACCEPT TREATMENT (2007).203 See FED. R. EVID. 704 Advisory Committee Note ("The older cases often contained
strictures against allowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate issues, as a particular
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In 1972,204 Federal Rule of Evidence 704 codified the better position:
"testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." 205 Following John Hinckley's
acquittal by reason of insanity on charges of attempting to assassinate
President Reagan, however, Congress amended Rule 704.206 The new
section reads:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state
or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate
issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 7
Nor is the majority's objection that experts cannot really ever
know what is in another person's mind20 8 persuasive, nor unique to
the insanity defense. Of course, what is inside another person's head
is difficult to ascertain, especially when we are trying to reconstruct a
past mental state from the testimony of witnesses doing their best
(one hopes) to remember what might have happened years ago. But
we do this all the time--in will contests,0 9 tort cases, 10 claims on
contracts, 211 child support cases, 212 and of course, run-of-the-mill
aspect of the rule against opinions. The rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of application, and
generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of useful information.").
204 See supra note 140.
205 FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
210 Subdivision (b) of Rule 704 was added in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984).207 FED. R. EviD. 704(b).
208 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2734-35.
209 See, e.g., In re Supervised Estate of Scholz, 859 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. App. 2007)
("When construing the language of a will, our primary objective is to determine the intent of the
testator."). "Where a latent ambiguity exists, the court may resort to parol evidence (such as
testimony of the scrivener) to determine the decedent's true intent." In re Estate of Schultheis,
747 A.2d 918, 923 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
210See, e.g., Jones v. Livingston, 416 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting in
wrongful death case that jury could infer both plaintiff-decedent's intent to become intoxicated
on the day of the accident and his knowledge that defendant would probably become intoxicated
as well from his sharing a 12-pack of beer with him).
21
1See, e.g., Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. Jolin, Inc., 634 So. 2d 466, 480 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (noting that "the evidence presented at trial to establish the true intent of the parties as to
whether the leases were sold and whether the contract should be reformed consisted of the
testimony of the parties to the transaction . . . as well as the attorneys and secretaries who
drafted the documents and the accountants and other financial assistants who participated in the
confection of the agreement.").
212 See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 607 S.E.2d 55 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (table) (noting that on
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criminal cases not involving an insanity defense, but only mens rea.2 13
The need to "get inside someone's head," and the difficulty of doing
that, is the primary reason we have juries.
Finally, to the extent that the Court is concerned about over-
reliance on expert witnesses, 214 the concern is misplaced. "The expert
who believes that her testimony will be revered by the jury based
upon the dazzle of her credentials, the glitter of her academic
appointments, and the sophistication of her analysis would be in for a
rude shock if she could hear the jury deliberate.... [T]he jury is far
more likely to tune the expert out rather than defer to her purported
expertise.211
The Court's disdain for mental health experts above all others is
perplexing. It may be, though, that the explanation lies in our
instinctive attempts to protect ourselves from the threat to our
equanimity the mentally ill pose simply by existing. If we deride the
mental health experts, then perhaps we unconsciously comfort
ourselves that we are not at risk: mental illness is probably all in their
heads.
CONCLUSION
Our unwillingness to reexamine the way that fear and loathing
have clouded our jurisprudence has more than theoretical results. Eric
Clark, once a bright, young football player, later a tormented sufferer
of paranoid schizophrenia, is now a first-degree murderer. It is
shameful enough that we turned our backs on the Clark family before
Eric shot Officer Moritz. By continuing to indulge our unconscious
reaction to mental illness, the Supreme Court's decisions in Clark v.
Arizona mean we have abandoned Eric all over again.
The rhetoric is strong, but with good reason:
Future generations will look back on us and our treatment of
people with mental illness much as we look back on the
Spanish Inquisitors who burned Jews at the stake for not
remand "the trial court may hear any testimony and receive any evidence necessary to determine
whether defendant sought decreased wages with the intent to avoid his reasonable support
obligations").
213 See, e.g., State v. Craven, 324 S.E.2d 599, 602 (N.C. 1985) (upholding admission of
"evidence of defendant's intentional sexual molestation of [witness as] relevant to the question
of whether defendant had intentionally, as opposed to inadvertently," molested victim).
214 See Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2734.
215 Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1139-40 (1997).
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
recanting their religion, or on the white racists who lynched
African Americans for being insubordinate. Future
generations will see us through the lens of history and ask
how we dared to be so ignorant.216
It is not daring that motivates us. As with the blood-boiling
comparisons above, the motivator is fear. Fear of the unknown. Fear
of difference. The most plausible explanation for our irrationality in
this realm is unconscious animus towards the mentally ill, arising
from a deep-seated need to distance ourselves from the frightening
possibility that we, too, are vulnerable. Although the phenomenon is
understandable, its effect is to deny the mentally ill, who are already
so disadvantaged, one of the few protections our society claims to
offer them.
The inexplicable decisions of Clark v. Arizona-finding no
semiotic truncation of Arizona's insanity statute, and upholding its
refusal to admit evidence of mental illness on the question of mens
rea-can be explained only by reference to our unconscious selves.
The mentally ill frighten us, and when we are frightened, we do not
think clearly. But the decisions in Clark serve only to stigmatize and
marginalize even further a group that needs our help as well as our
compassion. We must reexamine the criminal law's insanity
jurisprudence. Our unconscious animus toward the mentally ill ill-
serves them, and ill-becomes us.
216 Jim Randall, Mental Illness Is Not a Crime, L.A. TIMEs, July 16, 2006, at 5, available
at 2006 WLNR 12238681.
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